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The changing value of education
by Lisa Barrow, senior economist, and Cecilia Elena Rouse, professor of economics and public affairs, Princeton University,
and research associate, National Bureau of Economic Research
Why has the economic value of education stopped rising over the past ten years?
The most likely explanation seems to be that the booming economy of the late 1990s
helped to increase the average earnings of all workers, including those at the low end
of the skills distribution.
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the March Current Population
Survey for individuals aged 25–65 years.
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In the 1980s, education was an increas-
ingly worthwhile investment. According
to data from the Current Population Survey




77% more than the
$17,283 per year
earned by workers
with only a high
school diploma. By
1989, annual earn-






ates (see figure 1).
Similarly, high school
graduates earned
47% more per year,




school graduates earned 80% more than
high school dropouts in 1989 ($18,952
versus $10,522).
Researchers identified a number of
likely causes of rising income inequali-
ty, including declines in unions and
the real value of the minimum wage,
as well as growing demand for more
highly skilled workers, likely due to
technological change. Policymakers
considered ways to increase earnings
among low-wage workers, such as rais-
ing the minimum wage, expanding the
earned income tax credit, and encour-
aging individuals to get more educa-
tion. As former President Bill Clinton
wrote in 1997, “Today, more than ever
before in our history, education is the
fault line between those who will pros-
per in the new economy and those
who will not.”1
Changing labor markets in the 1990s
While the economic value of educa-
tion remains high, its rate of increase
has slowed or even declined since the
early to mid-1990s.2 Economists mea-
sure the economic value of additional
schooling as the average percentage
increase in mean earnings for an addi-
tional year of schooling while control-
ling for other differences in individual
characteristics, such as years of poten-
tial work experience, geographic region,
sex, race, and marital status. Figure 2
shows that the increase in annual earn-
ings associated with an additional year
of schooling was roughly 8.9% in 1979.
The value of an additional year of ed-
ucation peaked at 13.5% in 1993 and
has since fallen to 12.7% in 2005.2.  Economic value of an additional year of education
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the March Current Population
Survey for individuals aged 25–65 years.
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The stagnation in the growth of the
value of schooling occurred at the same
time as college tuition was rising; from
1993 to 2004, average tuition and fees
grew by nearly 46%.3 This led some to
ask whether a college education was
still worth the money. Nevertheless, our
previous work suggests that even when
the increased cost of college tuition has
been taken into account, a four-year
college degree is worth at least $300,000
more than a high school diploma over
an average working lifetime in net
present value terms.4 However, as with
many investments, today’s performance
is no guarantee of future performance.
So why has the economic value of edu-
cation declined or stagnated over the
past ten years? A large literature in the
1990s hypothesized that the major source
of increasing wage inequality of the
1980s was an increase in “skill-biased
technological change.”5 Namely, changes
in technology increased the productivity
of high-skilled workers relative to low-
skilled workers, leading to a shift in de-
mand toward more highly skilled labor.
As a result, wages for high-skilled workers
rose, while wages for low-skilled work-
ers fell. It would seem reasonable, there-
fore, that an explanation for the leveling
off of the return to education might be
a slowdown in the increase in demand
for such highly skilled labor. While this
is certainly possible, we do not consider
it the most likely explanation for two
reasons. First, as fig-
ure 1 shows, there has
been a large increase
in the wages of col-
lege graduates. Simi-
larly, Autor, Katz, and
Kearney document
that earnings at the
90th percentile of the
earnings distribu-
tion have been rising
steadily relative to me-
dian earnings since
the early 1970s.6 Sec-




of increases in college
enrollment and more
immigration of high-skilled workers.
Between 1996 and 2000, enrollment in
two- and four-year degree-granting in-
stitutions increased by nearly 7%; also,
since 1999, 34% of immigrants entering
the U.S. have had at least a bachelor’s de-
gree, compared with 28% of immigrants
arriving in the 1990s and 24% of immi-
grants arriving in the 1980s.7 Overall, the
percentage of the population aged 25–65
with at least a bachelor’s degree rose
from 26% in 1996 to 30% in 2004 (our
calculations based on March CPS data).
Autor, Katz, and Kearney also find that
the relative supply of college-equivalent
labor continued to increase through-
out the late 1990s and early 2000s.8 The
fact that the wages of college graduates
increased so dramatically in spite of the
likely increase in the relative supply of
college graduates is consistent with in-
creasing—not decreasing—demand.
The average earnings of workers with
lower levels of education have also in-
creased since 1993. It is this increase
that accounts for the slowing growth
in the value of education. Given the
growth in the average earnings of college-
educated workers, the value of education
would have risen at a faster rate since
1993 than it did between 1980 and 1990
if the earnings of those with less educa-
tion had either decreased or remained
constant. And so, we might ask why the
earnings of these less educated work-
ers have increased.
Changes in compensation
One possibility is that the changing earn-
ings trends are an “illusion” driven by
changes in compensation practices and/
or changes in labor force composition.
For example, if highly educated work-
ers increasingly receive compensation
in the form of benefits, such as health
insurance, while less educated workers
are less likely to receive health insurance,
the value of education in terms of total
compensation may be increasing at a
faster rate than the value measured by
wages and salaries alone. Pierce finds
that compensation inequality was in-
creasing faster than wage inequality
through the mid-1990s and that it was
driven largely by declines in the health
insurance coverage rate for workers at
the bottom of the distribution.9 Data
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Employer Costs for Employee Compensation
indicate that employer benefits costs
have been rising faster than wage and
salary costs since 2000, which, depend-
ing on the distribution of the benefits,
could mean that the value of education
in terms of total compensation may have
continued to rise at a high rate. In con-
trast, we think there is less support for
labor force composition changes that
contribute to the slowing of the growth
in the value of education. Over the past
ten years, labor force participation
among high school dropouts has been
increasing (even when assuming all in-
carcerated people are high school drop-
outs), while participation rates for those
with more education have been falling.
These changes in participation would
more likely lead to an increase in the
estimates of the value of education if
we assume that within the completed
education category, the expected earn-
ings of the individuals who are not par-
ticipating in the labor market are lower
than the observed earnings of the indi-
viduals who are participating in the labor
market. Of course, there may be other
changes in the composition of the labor
force that might explain these trends.
Minimum wage increases in the late
1990s may also have helped increase
the wages of the least skilled workers.
However, minimum wage increases are
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two reasons. First, the latest increase
in the federal minimum wage was in
late 1997, two years after average wages
of the least skilled workers began to
increase. And, the federal minimum
wage has not been changed since then,
such that it cannot account for further
at the low end of the skills distribution.
Studies of labor market cyclicality show
that earnings and (especially) employ-
ment are procyclical and that less edu-
cated individuals experience greater
cyclical variation than more educated
individuals.13
Going forward, the recent push to increase the minimum wage
will likely help keep the value of education from increasing
rapidly in the near future.
increases in the wages of low-skilled
workers. Although 17 states and the
District of Columbia have raised their
minimum wages above the 1997 federal
minimum, several large states—including
Florida, New Jersey, and New York—did
not enact minimum wages above the
federal minimum until 2005.10 Thus,
only 30% of payroll employment was
in states with minimum wages above the
federal minimum as of January 1, 2004,
making it unlikely that these state mini-
mum wages fully account for changes in
average wages across the entire coun-
try.11 Second, although Lee finds that
the fall in the real value of the mini-
mum wage can explain much of the
increase in inequality at the bottom of
the wage distribution over the 1980s
(implying that the minimum wage in-
creases of the mid-1990s also propped
up wages at the bottom of the wage
distribution), Autor, Katz, and Kearney
question this interpretation.12 They high-
light that much of the decline in the real
value of the minimum wage during the
1980s occurred during an economic
downturn, whereas the minimum wage
increases in the 1990s were legislated
during economic expansions. As a result,
the time series relationship between in-
equality and the minimum wage may
be spurious. Further, both studies note
the anomaly that the minimum wage
seems to be related to inequality at
both the bottom and the top of the
wage distribution.
Conclusion
The booming economy of the late 1990s
appears to have increased the average
earnings of all workers, including those
The puzzle associated with this explana-
tion, however, is why wages of the least
educated continued to rise or at least
did not fall relative to those of the more
educated during the 2001 recession.
Any explanation for the changes in
the economic value of education over
the past 15 years will likely involve a
combination of the many factors dis-
cussed in this article. Going forward,
the recent push to increase the mini-
mum wage will likely help keep the value
of education from increasing rapidly
in the near future. That said, large shifts
in the relative demand for, or supply of,
more educated or less educated labor
could change that. For now, at least, the
value of education in terms of earn-
ings remains near its peak, providing
much incentive for young people to
pursue a college education.
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